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THE USE OF MEDICAL BOOKS IN THE EXAMI-
NATION OF EXPERTS.
A medical expert must have an opinion of his own on the
subject matter about which he.is to testify. He may refresh
his recollection by reference to standard authorities, but the
judgment or opinion which he gives must be his own,and not
merely that of another. It must be independent of the works
which he has consulted or studied. If it appears that the ex-
pert is simply repeating what he has read in standard author-
ities, or been informed by other experts, he cannot qualify,
unless it further appears that from his own knowledge or
experience he is competent to form an independent opinion
as to the correctness of what he has read or been informed.
In People v. Millard, 53 Michigan. 63. 76, Mr. justice
Campbell said:
"No one has any title to respect as an expert or has any
right to give an opinion upon the stand, unless as his own
opinion; and if he has not given the subject involved such
careful and indiscriminating study as has resulted in the
formation of a definite opinion, he has no business to give it.
Such an opinion can only be safely formed or expressed by
22 327
MEDICAL BOOKS IN EXPERT EVIDENCE.
persons who have made the scientific questions involved mat-
ters of definite and intelligent study, and who have by such
application, made up their own minds. In doing so it is their
business to resort to such aids, by reading and study, as they
have reason to believe contain the information they need.
This will naturally include the literature of the subject.
But if they have only taken trouble enough to find, or sup-
pose they find, that certain authors say certain things, without
further satisfying themselves how reliable such statements
are, their own opinion must be of very moderate value, and,
whether correct or incorrect, cannot be fortified before ajury
by statements of what those authors hold on the subject.
The jury are only concerned to know what the witness
thinks, and what capacity and judgment he shows to make
his opinion worthy of respect."
This rule is at times one of much practical importance
in the trial of causes. In a celebrated recent poisoning
case tried in the criminal courts of Philadelphia, one of the
main points in controversy was whether arsenic was one of
the constituent elements of the human body. The defence
called a well-known physician who unqualifiedly testified that
arsenic was one of the constituent elements of the human
body. He fortified his opinion by reference to the writings
of a distinguished German chemist, and passed unchallenged
as an expert. Within a few months thereafter, in a similar
case, this expert was again called by the defence for the
same purpose. Upon cross-examination, he admitted that
he based his opinion exclusively upon his reading of the
writings of the German chemist, and that from his observa-
tion, experience and other readings, he was not able to
form an independent judgment or opinion as to whether
arsenic was one of the constituent elements of the human
body. The trial Judge ruled that the expert was not compe-
tent to testify on the subject, and he ordered all testimony
by the expert on the subject stricken out.
It is no doubt true that unless the subject inquired about
is a new or novel one, an expert will seldom admit that
he is incapable of forming an independent judgment or
opinion on the subject.
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While an expert must have an independent and definite
opinion of his own, it is not, however, necessary that he
should have formed such an opinion from practical expe-
rience or observation. In fact, it is not necessary that he
should have had any practical experience in the subject
inquired about; his reading of standard and recognized
authorities alone is sufficient. Thus, in Hardiman v. Brown,
162 Massachusetts, 585, a practicing physician, of long
experience, knew what the medical authorities said in regard
to tumors, and he was permitted to testify as to whether
in his opinion a tumor at the base of the brain was the excit-
ing cause of the plaintiff's illness; though in his practice he
had not been familiar with tumors on the brain.
To permit an expert without any practical experience or
observation to qualify by reading alone, practically amounLs,
in most instances, to allowing the expert to repeat what he
has read.
It is apparently now settled by the authorities beyond
controversy that a standard medical work of recognized
authority is not admissible for the purpose of establishing
any medical fact; that is to say, the party having the burden
of proving a certain medical fact cannot do so by offering
in evidence a medical work stating the fact. An expert
must be called to prove the fact, even though he merely
repeats what is so much more authoritatively stated in a
recognized treatise.
The rule is thus stated in Lawson on Expert and Opin-
ion Evidence, Rule 34, page 202:
"Books of science and art are not admissible in evidence
to prove the opinions contained therein."
In State v. O'Brien, 7 R. I., 336, the Court refused to
permit Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence, a text-book of the
highest authority, to be read to the jury in support of a
medical fact necessary to be established.
So in Boehringer v. Richard's Medicine Co., 9 Texas
Civil Appeals, 284, the Court refused to permit counsel to
read from United States Medical Dispensatory for a similar
purpose, yet any one familiar with the subject well knows
that few could testify relative to most of the topics treated
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in .such a work without first referring to it, or a similar
authority.
To allow an expert to testify from his reading of standard
authorities alone, and yet at the same time to exclude such
works as original evidence, seems to be a distinction with-
out a difference. Any one familiar with the so-called medical
-expert vell lknows that the great majority of them specially
.qualify themselves before trial by reading the standard
authorities. In fact, few of them who appear at the trial of
causes are competent to form an independent opinion of
their own. If they could not refer to the authorities, few
of them would attempt to qualify as an expert. Their testi-
mony is a substantial "rehash" of what they have read.
Who for a moment would accept the opinion of the average
expert in perference to the statements of such a standard
authority as Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence, or other similar
works? The great majority of subjects discussed in such
works are undisputed and are generally recognized and
accepted by the medical profession at large.
There is a clear distinction between the recognized and
accepted facts of medicine, and the opinion of an expert
on the special facts of a particular case. No medical work
would be of any special assistance in itself in making clear
the significance and bearing of the complicated facts of a
particular case, and for such a purpose medical treatises
should be excluded, not because the authors cannot be sub-
jected to cross-examination, but because their works are of
little value, and can throw but little light upon the subject.
And further, should such works happen to contain an opinion
on any particular state of facts, it might well be excluded on
the ground that the opinion of the author on a particular case
is mere hearsay. This reason, however, does not apply to
well-recognized and accepted physical and chemical phe-
nomena, such as the effect of arsenic on the human body,
the effect of burns on the tissue and bones, etc. For the
purpose of establishing such facts, the Court should permit
proof of such facts by reference to authorities that are to the
satisfaction of the Court proved to be standard and accepted
authorities. The Courts, however, make no such distinction,
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and exclude medical works for all purposes of proof what-
ever.
Much might be said in support of the suggestion that med-
ical books should be admissible for the purpose of proving
ordinary and well recognized medical facts. A medical
expert is as a rule a partisan in the paid employment of the
party calling him. He attempts to formulate an opinion
favorable to his client. The opinion of such a person is much
less weighty than that of recognized experts who devote
their skill and experience to the ascertainment of truth for
the instruction of the profession at large. The latter are
generally recognized as non-partisan. None of the many
reasons assigned by the courts for rejecting medical works
as original evidence are entirely satisfactory from a prac-
tical point of view.
Mr. Wigmore, in his recent work on Evidence, Volume
3, page 2-173, paragraph 1692, makes several weighty
suggestions for the admission of such works.
"There is no need of assuming a higher degree of
sincerity for learned writers as a class than for other
persons ; but we may at least say that in the usual instance
their state of mind fulfils the ordinary requirement for the
hearsay exceptions, namely, that the declarant should have
' no motive to misrepresent.' They may have a bias in-favor
of a theory, but it is a bias in favor of the truth as they see
it; it is not a bias in favor of a cause or of an individual.
Their statement is made with no view to a litigation or
to the interests of a litigable affair..... .The writer
of a learned treatise publishes primarily for his profession.
He knows that every conclusion will be subjected to care-
ful professional criticism, and is open ultimately to certain
refutation if not well-founded; that his reputation depends
on the correctness of his data and the validity- of his con-
clusions; and that he might better not have written than
put forth statements in which may be detected a lack of
sincerity of method and of accuracy of results. The motive,
in other words, is precisely the same in character and is
more certain in its influence than that which is accepted as
sufficient in some of the other hearsay exceptions, namely,
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the unwelcome probability of a detection and exposure of
errors. Finally, the guarantees of accuracy, such as they
are, at least are greater than those which accompany the
testimony of so many expert witnesses on the stand. The
abuses of expert testimony, arising from the fact that such
witnesses are too often in effect paid to take a partisan
view and are practically untrustworthy, are too well known
to repeat. It must be admitted that those who write with
no view to litigation are at least as trustworthy, though
unsworn and unexamined, as perhaps the greater portion
of those who take the stand for a fee from one of the
litigants. It may be concluded, then, that there is in
these cases a sufficient circumstantial guarantee of trust-
worthiness. The Court in each instance should in its dis-
cretion exclude writings which for one reason or another
do not seem to be sufficiently worthy of trust."
Not only have the courts excluded such works as original
evidence, but they have carried the rule so far as to prac-
tically exclude them as evidence in any manner whatever.
Even an expert who admits that his opinion is based on
reading alone, cannot substantiate his opinion by stating
what the authorities say on the subject. It is difficult to
perceive why the opinion of such an expert, without any
original investigation or experiment, should be preferred
to the very sources of information upon which he bases
his opinion. The law is well settled, however, that he cannot
state the views of the authors which he has consulted,
neither can he be asked in examination-in-chief whether
he concurs with the views of any particular author, or
on cross-examination except to test his competency.
In fact, the rule has been extended so far by some courts
that they will not permit an expert, who has not founded
his opinion upon any particular authority, to be interrog-
ated in cross-examination as to the views of standard
and recognized authorities for the purpose of showing that
his opinion is contrary to the recognized views of the pro-
fession. If, however, he states in examination-in-chief that
he founds his opinion on any particular authority, these
courts permit his cross-examination on the views of these
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particular authorities, and these alone, for the purpose of
showing that he has misunderstood or misquoted such
authorities. Where any expert has stated an opinion, it
is incomprehensible why it should not be shown in cross-
examination that his views, however founded, are contrary
to the accepted views of the profession, as set forth in the
works of recognized authority.
The principal rules regulating the use of medical books
in the examination of experts, chus briefly suggested, may
be categorically stated as follows:
I.-AN EXPERT MUST HAVE AN OPINION OF HIS OWN.
Obvious as this rule is, no doubt many experts could be
disqualified by skilful cross-examination by showing that
their opinions are solely those of others, and that they can-
not formulate an independent opinion of their own.
In Huffman v. Click, 77 North Carolina, 55, 57, it is said:
"The physician on examination in this case had the
right to refresh his knowledge by referring to standard
books in his profession, but his evidence must be his own,
independent of the works."
In People v. Millard, 53 Michigan, 63, 76, Mr. Justice
Campbell states the rule thus:
"No one has any title to respect as an expert, or has
any right to give an opinion upon the stand, unless as his
own opinion ........ But if they [experts] have only
taken trouble enough to find, or suppose they find, that
certain authors say certain things, without further satisfying
themselves how reliable such statements are, their own opin-
ions must be of very moderate value, and, whether correct
or incorrect, cannot be fortified before a jury by statements
of what those authors hold on the subject. The jury are
only concerned to know what the witness thinks, and what
capacity and judgment he shows to make his opinion worthy
of respect."
In State v. Baldwin, 36 Kansas, I, 17, it was said:
"A witness may refresh his recollections by reference to
standard authorities, but the judgment or opinion which
he gives must be his own, and not merely that of another."
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II.-MAY QUALIFY BY READING WITHOUT PRACTICAL
EXPERIENCE.
In State v. Wood, 53 New Hampshire, 484, the prisoner
was on trial for abortion. F., a physician, gave his opin-
ion as to the effect of a certain drug upon the womb. F's
opinion was derived entirely from his reading. It was held
that his opinion was admissible.
In Hardiman v. Brown, 162 Massachusetts, 585, a prac-
ticing physician, of long experience, knew what the med-
ical authorities said in regard to tumors. The Court per-
mitted him to testify as to whether, in his opinion, a tumor
at the base of the brain was the exciting cause of the per-
son's illness, though in his practice he had not been familiar
with tumors on the brain.
In People v. Thacker, io8 Michigan, 652, a practicing
physician, who was a graduate of a medical college, and had
equipped himself by reading books and hearing lectures to
have a definite opinion of his own, was permitted to tes-
tify as an expert on the subject of arsenical poisoning,
though it was not shown he had had any experience in
poisoning cases.
In Siebert v. People, 143 Illinois, 571, 579, on appeal
it was claimed that the Court erred in allowing Dr. S. C.
Gillett and Dr. C. L. Smith to testify as experts on the
subject of arsenical poisoning. Dr Gillett, as to his quali-
fications as an expert, testified that his profession was that
of physician and surgeon; that he was a graduate of Rush
Medical College of Chicago; that he had been a practicing
physician in Aurora for thirty-four years, and that he was
a licensed physician under the laws of Illinois. An hypothe-
tical question was then put to him by the prosecution set-
ting forth the symptoms of the deceased, and he was asked
from what cause in his opinion the deceased came to his
death. This was objected to by both of the defendants, on
the ground that the witness did not qualify as an expert,
which objection was overruled, the defendants excepting.
The witness then testified, in substance, "If I find arsenic,
then I should expect he died from the effects of arsenic."
In overruling the exception, the Court said:
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"It will be observed that the two witnesses were both
graduates of medical colleges and that they were engaged
in general practice and had been for a number of years.
Whether they have ever had any experience in a case of poi-
soning in their practice does not appear from their examina-
tion. It is insisted that it devolved on the prosecution to show
that the witnesses had, in their practice, a case of arsenical
poisoning,* before they could testify. . . Without, how-
ever, extending the discussion of the question any further,
we are inclined to hold that the opinions of the witnesses,
founded on their practice, were competent evidence. What
weight, however, should be given to the evidence was a
question for the jury."
III.-MEDICAL BOOKS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
THOUGH STANDARD AUTHORITIES.
"Books of science and art are not admissible in evidence
to prove the opinions contained therein."-Lawson on Ex-
pert and Opinion Evidence, Rule 34, Page 202.
In Huffman v. Click, 77 North Carolina, 55, the Court
excluded a bo6k on medical jurisprudence in a case in which
the existence of paralysis, caused by hysteria, was at issue.
where the book was offered to show that the symptoms
testified to were common in cases of hysteria, and that
this was one of the existing causes of paralysis.
In Tucker v. Donald, 6o Mississippi, 46o, it was held that
extracts from Copeland's Medical Dictionary, referring to
paralysis, were not admissible in evidence.
In State v. O'Brien, 7 R. I., 336, upon the trial of a
murder case, the Court refused to permit Taylor's Medical
Jurisprudence, a text-book of recognized authority, to be
read to the jury as evidence, and the Supreme Court of
that State, in approving of this ruling of the Presiding Judge,
said:
"Scientific men- are permitted to give their opinion as
experts because under oath, but the books which they write,
because not under oath, are excluded."
In Boehringer v. Richard's Medicine Company, 9 Texas,
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Civil Appeals, 284, it was held that the United States Med-
ical Dispensatory was not admissible in evidence to establish
a fact therein contained.
In Collier v. Simpson, 5 Carrington & Payne, 73, it was
held that medical books, though stated by medical witnesses
to be medical authorities, were not admissible in evidence
as to the prescribing of medicines, to show that certain
doses were sanctioned.
In Fowler v. Lewis, 25 Texas, 38o, it was held that a
treatise on horses by "Youatt," after being established to
be an authority on the subject, could not be read to the jury.
IV.-AN EXPERT MAY REFER GENERALLY TO THE AUTHORS
HE HAS READ, BUT CANNOT GIVE THE CON-
TENTS OF THEIR BOOKS.
In State v. Baldwin, 36 Kansas, I, 16, an objection was
made to the testimony of Dr. Campbell, who was a practicing
physician of more than twelve years' experience. He testi-
fied as an expert, and, after showing some of the effects of
chloroform upon the human system, was asked, "How is
it regarded by medical authorities upon the subject, and by
medical men who are authority upon that subject?" He
answered:
"It is regarded by writers on that subject, and by all men
who have used it to any great extent, and by all univer-
sally, so far as I know, as a very dangerous agent, and an
agent, if pushed beyond a certain point, which will produce
death; that is, in danger always of producing death. To be
sure a great many men have used it a great deal, and have
had no bad results from it."
In reviewing the ruling of the lower Court, it was said:
"Although the courts are not uniform in their holdings
upon the admissibility in evidence of medical and scientific
books, the great weight of authority is that they cannot be
admitted to prove the declarations or opinions which they
contain; this upon the theory that the authors did not write
under oath, and that their grounds of belief and processes
of reasoning cannot be tested by cross-examination. But
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while the books are not admissible, an expert witness is not
confined wholly to his personal experience in the treatment
of men, but his opinions formed in part by the reading of
treatises prepared bypersons of acknowledged ability maybe
given in evidence. So also may a witness refresh his recol-
lection by reference to standard authorities; but the judg-
ment or opinion which he gives must be his own and not
merely that of the author. In an early case, .... The
Chief Justice responded:
"'I do not think the books themselves can be read, but
I do not see any objection to your asking Sir Henry Halford
his judgment and the ground of it, which may be in some
degree founded upon books as a part of his general knowl-
edge.'
"The present case falls within this authority; Dr. Camp-
bell is shown to be a man of large experience and extended
reading in his profession, who had given his own opinion,
and it was not improper for him to state that the opinion
was formed from the study of books and men, and also
that all the writers and authorities on the subject so far as
he knew supported him in his opinion."
In Boyle v. State, 57 Wis., 472, 478, it was said:
"It seems to us that the Court erred in permitting Dr.
Cody to testify as to what was said in standard medical
works upon the subject of strangulation, and what effects
would be produced upon the body of the deceased when death
resulted from such cause. .... .If it be urged that
the works of medical writers were not in fact offered in
evidence, but that the witness was called upon to testify as to
what certain medical works contained on the subject under
investigation, it cannot help the state, as in such case the
attempt is to put in evidence what is stated by a medical
authority upon the subject of inquiry, without producing the
book, and depending upon the memory of the witness. Cer-
tainly if the book itself cannot be read in evidence to the
jury, the witness cannot be permitted to give extracts from
it as evidence, depending upon his memory for their cor-
rectness ..... .. The effect of the evidence given under
objection by Dr. Cody was to put before the jury as evidence
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what the medical works laid down as evidences of strangula-
tion. If this may be done indirectly by the oral testimony
o the person who has read the medical works, it would cer-
tainly be a much safer rule to permit the books themselves
to be read to the jury as being better evidence of the facts."
V.-MEDICAL BOOKS CANNOT BE READ IN CHIEF TO THE
EXPERT AND ASKED WHETHER HE CON-
CURS WITH THEM.
This rule is more often violated than any of the others.
It is most common to see counsel read from a medical
work and then ask his own witness whether he concurs
with the author. Frequently no objection is raised to this
practice.
In Pahl v. Troy City Railway Co., 81 N. Y. Supp., 46,
counsel was not permitted to read from a medical book a
statement as to the symptoms of a certain disease, and then
ask the witness if he subscribed thereto. The Court said:
"The plaintiff was thus enabled to bring to the knowl-
edge of the jury the statement, not under oath, of Dr.
Charles L. Dana, whose writings on the subject of nervous
diseases the witness testified were considered authoritative
by the medical profession, and without the defendant hav-
ing an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Dana as to the facts
and symptoms upon which he based his opinion, and as to
whether perchance his views had undergone a change since
the article was written. The fact that the article read was
part of a medical book, doubtless, gave the statement therein
contained much more weight with the jury than it would
have received simply as part of the oral testimony of a local
physician."
In Comm. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass., 122, a witness, called
by the defendant as an expert on the subject of blood-stains,
having said that, in his opinion, it was impossible to deter-
mine. with certainty, in the case of a stain that had been
upon clothing seven days, whether it was human blood,
was asked whether he coincided with the views of Dr.
Taylor, as expressed in Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence,
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which book was passed to the witness. The counsel then
proposed that a certain paragraph upon that point from
the book, with which the witness concurred in opinion,
should be read to the jury by the witness; but the Court
excluded it. (See page 130).
On appeal, this ruling was affirmed, the Court saying on
page i39:
"The refusal to allow a witness to read extracts from a
book on medical jurisprudence was in accordance with a
well settled practice in this Commonwealth."
In Mason v. Hicks, 6o Hun., 46, 56, the petitioner's
counsel at the trial was permitted to read from medical books
what different authors had written in relation to the condi-
tion of a patient when the arm regained power quicker and
better than the leg, and then asked the witness the following
question: "Assuming the facts stated there, what do you
think as to the proposition that that is a bad indication?"
To which the witness answered: "It is an unfavorable con-
dition as compared to the reverse when the limb mends first
and the arm last; the condition is more favorable, more
favorable as to the condition of the brain, and shows a
less degree of disorganization of the brain." On appeal the
Court said:
"This evidence was objected to, and the counsel for the
appellant repeatedly asked the court to strike out what was
read from the books, which was denied. We think this
was error. It was, in effect, asking the witness to answer
a question not based upon any hypothesis founded upon
facts proved in the case, but to answer a question based
upon the hypothesis that the statements read were true. The
effect of these rulings was to bring before the jury the
unverified statements of the authors of the books read, and
would tend to improperly influence a jury in the determina-
tion of the question before them. Medical books cannot be
introduced in evidence, nor can an expert witness be per-
mitted to testify to statements made therein; and it is equally
improper to permit the reading of such books to the jury
by counsel."
In Foggett v. Fisher, 48 N. Y. Supp., 741, counsel,
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for the .purpose of proving the extent and effect of the
plaintiff's injury, called a medical witness who having
given his view of the nature of the injury to the plaintiff.
testified that, in his opinion, it was a progressive injury.
Then he proceeded to state that he knew Prof. Gross' work,
and that it was recognized as authority. Thereupon, in
answer to questions put to him, the witness having stated
that Prof. Gross' work contained a statement as to the prob-
able effect of injuries to nerves, he pointed out the state-
ment referred to. The plaintiff's counsel was then per-
mitted to read in evidence from the book of such professor
the following: " Severe effects often follow contusion of
the nerves, the parts to which they are distributed becoming
numb, cold, withered, more or less painful, and ultimately,
almost entirely useless;" and the further clause from the
same book that "effects of this kind sometimes succeed an
accident of apparently the most trifling character." The
defendant's counsel objected to all this evidence when of-
fered, and excepted to the rulings for its reception.
The Court on appeal said:
"The question of damages was necessarily an important
one, and it cannot be seen that the defendant may not have
been prejudiced by the reception as evidence of those par-
agraphs from the book of Prof. Gross. Our attention is
called to no rule of evidence which could permit the intro-
duction of that evidence."
VI.-CAN THE CONTENTS OF A MEDICAL BOOK BE GOT IN
EVIDENCE UNDER GUISE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION?
There are three views on this subject.
(a) A medical expert may be cross-examined generally
as to the views of standard medical works, for the purpose of
ascertaining his knowledge and competency, irrespective
of the fact that he may not have referred to them in his
examination-in-chief, or relied upon them in forming his
opinion.
(b) A medical expert cannot be cross-examined generally
as to the contents of standard medical works for the sole
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purpose of ascertaining his general knowledge and com-
petency.
(c) While an expert cannot be cross-examined gen-
erally as to the contents of standard medical works for the
purpose of ascertaining his general knowledge and com-
petency, yet if he relies upon any particular authority, he
may be cross-examined as to that authority, in order to
show that he misunderstood or misquoted the authority.
The authorities in support of these three views are as
follows, and will be found set forth under the heads as above
stated:
The first view is best stated in the case of Egan v. Dry
Dock &c. R. R. Co., 12 Appellate Division (N. Y.), 556.
In that case the defendant put upon the stand, as an expert
Dr. Charles E. Emery, who gave material evidence upon the
various points in the case. During his cross-examination,
his attention was called to certain books on the design,
construction and operation of boilers,--one written by
Charles A. Smith and another by Prof. Thurston, who was
one of the plaintiff's experts,-as to which he answered that
he knew of those books, and that they were standard works
on engineering subjects. Dr. Emery had testified that, in
his judgment, the hydrostatic test was very effective; and
that the hammer test was, in his judgment, inefficient and
insufficient. In view of that testimony certain passages from
the two books above mentioned, as to the efficiency of the
hammer test, were read to him, and he was asked whether or
not he agreed with what was stated in those passages. This
testimony was objected to as immaterial, and, the objection
having been overruled, an exception was taken.
It will be observed that in this case the witness was under
cross-examination and the purpose of the question was to
ascertain whether he concurred with the views of the authors
of standard treatises whose conclusions were at variance
with those of the witness. The object of counsel was to
discredit the witness. Under rule five this course could
not have been pursued in the examination of the expert in
chief.
In reversing the Court said: "We are quite clear that
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this evidence was entirely competent. There is no doubt
that the contents of scientific books cannot be read to a
jury for the purpose of proving the facts or establishing
the deductions stated in them. The reasons for this rule
are so thoroughly stated in the text-books that it is not
here necessary to comment upon it. But the contents of
the books which are referred to in this particular case did
not come within that rule. Whenever a man holds himself
out as an expert witness and undertakes to give his opinion
upon any scientific matter, it is not only proper to examine
him as to the grounds of his opinion, but his qualifications
as an expert may be tested upon cross-examination in any
way which will enable the jury, who are to pass upon the
weight to be given to his testimony, to judge intelligently
about it. For that purpose, it is perfectly proper to ask
whether or not the opinion he has expressed agrees with the
opinion of other people who are conceded to be learned upon
the same subject, because, if an expert witness admitted that
the opinion which he expressed was contrary to the opinion
which was held upon the same subject by other men who
were acquainted with the same science, it might, unless the
reasons which he gave for his opinion were satisfactory, tend
strongly to detract from the weight which that opinion would
otherwise receive. For the same reason, if the witness
admitted the text writers of acknowledged authority and had
expressed opinions contrary to the one which he gave in
regard to the matter under examination, that might go to
detract from the weight to be given to such testimony.
Therefore, it has been the custom, in this State at least, to
call the attention of an expert witness, upon cross-examina-
tion, to books upon the subject, and ask whether or not
authors whom he admitted to be good authority had not
expressed opinions different from that which was given by
him upon the stand. The reference to books in such cases is
not made for the purpose of making the statements in the
books evidence before the jury, but solely for the purpose
of ascertaining the weight to be given to the testimony of
the witness. The extent to which such examination may go
is very largely in the discretion of the court. It has been
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usual to permit questions of that kind to be asked in this
State, and we are not aware of any well-founded objection
to it. For this reason, we think that the objection to this
kind of testimony was properly overruled."
In Hutchinson v. State, 19 Neb., 262, counsel for the de-
fendant objected to certain questions propounded to Dr. A.
L. Root by the State in cross-examination. The prosecu-
trix testified that the intercourse which resulted in the birth
of the child consisted of a single act of copulation had by
force and against her consent, and at the period of the men-
strual flow, and that the time of gestation was extended.
The defendant sought to show by Dr. A. L. Root, by
hypothetical questions as well as by his own experience, that
the theory of the prosecution was wrong; that pregnancy
would not probably result from a single act of intercourse
under the circumstances named, that being the first and only
such act of the prosecutrix. Upon the cross-examination,
the following occurred:
"Q. I will ask you to state, doctor,' if the testimony
that you have given in reference to a woman becoming preg-
nant in case of rape or when sexual intercourse is had by
force, if the testimony which you have given is not based
upon medical authorities rather than upon your own expe-
rience.
"A. Yes, the testimony is all based upon medical
authorities.
"Q. I will ask you to state what the medical authorities
hold upon that question now.
"Objected to as incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant,
and not proper cross-examination. Overruled and excep-
tion."
In sustaining the Court below, it was said:
"Aside from the fact that the testimony was given in
chief upon the teachings of the medical authorities to a
great extent, we think the proper and legitimate scope of
cross-examination would permit the interrogatory. If the
witness had been testifying from his experience and observa-
tion from a long course of practice, it was yet proper, for
the purpose of ascertaining his means of knowledge by a
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reference to the teachings of the text-books of his profession
and the scientific works from which he had testified. Again,
we cannot conceive that it would be possible by any rule of
evidence to base the testimony in chief of the witness upon
his experience in obstetrics. For instance, the normal period
of gestation, the probability of conception in the first act
of intercourse, the length of the period of gestation in the
case of the first as compared with subsequent children, the
number of days that ill health caused by uterine disorders
would shorten the period of gestation, if at all, and many
other prominent elements in the case presented by the de-
fence, would naturally and inevitably require the witness
to go outside of the domain of experience as an obstetrician,
and it seems to us that he very properly and truthfully
answered that this testimony was based upon medical
authorities. For the purpose, therefore, of testing his recol-
lection as well as his knowledge, it was proper to interrogate
him as to the teachings of those authorities, and in case
his testimony was incorrect, to confront him with them in
order that he might be corrected and the jury thus be
rendered able to judge of the weight to which his testi-
mony was entitled. It is insisted that the testimony was
inadmissible because 'the testimony of the witness shows
that his opinion on the point in question was opposed to these
same medical authorities.' As we have shown, the testimony
entered the domain of science, the ground upon which the
objection is founded appeals most strongly to the mind of the
writer as cogent reasons why the cross-examination was
proper."
In Hess v. Lowry, 122 Ind., 225, the Court said:
"In the cross-examination of a medical expert, the witness
was asked whether certain statements were not made by cer-
tain writers on surgery, the statement referred to being read
from a book held by counsel as part of the question. It is
recognized as a proper method of cross-examination in order
to test the learning of a witness who testifies as an expert
to refer to books of approved authority upon the subjects
under investigation."
'Were it not for the authorities next to be considered, it
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would be difficult to perceive how any objection could be
raised to this method of ascertaining the competency and
qualification of a medical expert. An expert may give any
opinion he sees fit to announce, and if he is skilful enough
to avoid reference to any authorities in support of his
opinion, he could prevent a successful attack upon his con-
clusions by way of cross-examination, if counsel were pre-
vented from interrogating him as to the views of standard
and recognized authorities. Medical subjects are peculiarly
within the province of expert opinion, and if an expert
could not be cross-examined in order to show the fallacy of
his opinion by reference to standard authorities, the opinion
of a mere " quack " or " fraud " might have more weight
with a jury than the opinion of a really skilled and expe-
rienced physician.
Reasonable as is the rule which permits cross-examina-
tion on the contents of standard authorities, it has its limits,
in that it cannot be resorted to for the sole purpose of
presenting to a jury the views of medical writers favorable
to the side of the cross-examiner. Should the Court be
satisfied that the object of counsel in cross-examination
is not to contest the skill and competency of the expert, but
merely to get before the jury the views of authors favorable
to his theory of the case, then it would be proper to exclude
such a method of cross-examination.
This limitation of the rule is well expressed in the case
of Fisher v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 89 California, 399:
'" While it is to be regretted if in the proper exercise of
the right of cross-examination, it shall appear that certain
medical writers of a repute differ from the witness, and
so a party will get the benefit of unsworn testimony, still
this evil, unavoidable in the nature of things, is, in my opin-
ion, not at all commensurate with that which would deprive
the party in such a case of the best touch-stone known to
legal science, by which to estimate the value of testimony.
"And if, on general principles, such questions are legiti-
mate on cross-examination. I do not see how a party can be
deprived of his right because such evil consequences may
follow.
MEDICAL BOOKS IN EXPERT EVIDENCE.
"But since consequences are likely to follow which ad-
mittedly should be avoided if possible, such examination
should be strictly limited to this one purpose, for which
only it can be permitted.
"I think no fair-minded person can closely study this
record without being convinced that the evidence was not
put in with any such purpose. No doubt counsel offered
it under the impression that it was justified as inconsis-
tent with opinions which the witness had claimed were
sustained by medical authorities. I have shown that the
claim cannot be sustained on that ground. In fact, although
the witness took issue with some statements read, they can-
not fairly be said to contradict his evidence in any respect.
"They were evidently intended as evidence for the plain-
tiff, to sustain his theory of the case, and not to affect the
competency of the witness or the value of his testimony."
(b)
Cannot be cross-examined generally on medical books to
test competency.
In Davis v. State of Maryland, 38 Md., 15, an exception
was taken at the trial to the cross-examination of a medical
expert. It appeared that no autopsy of the body was made;
the examination being confined to an external examination
of the wounds. The expert was asked if there was any
medical or scientific term, distinguishing the examination
thus made from autopsy. To which he answered, " Some
books on medical jurisprudence called it an examination of
the body." In answer to the further question, as to what
book, witness replied, "Taylor;" whereupon the counsel for
the prisoner handed the book to the witness, and asked him
to turn to that part of it in which such an examination was
so designated.
"If the purpose was to test the medical knowledge of the
witness," the Court said, "the mode proposed certainly
was not a very satisfactory way to do so. The medical
knowledge of a witness, who is competent to testify as an
expert, it is but fair to presume is founded upon authorities
so differing in value, and upon such various degrees of
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practice and experience, that it is doubtful, to say the least
of it, whether the accuracy of his recollection as to a tech-
nical term used by a writer, can be said to test in any
manner his general knowledge and experience. Be that,
however, as it may, we are of opinion that the book could not
be handed to the witness even for such a purpose. Courts
are not presumed to be familiar with the principles, or the
terms used by medical authors, and when questions arise,
necessarily involving their application, they must be proved
as facts are proved, by witnesses competent to testify in
regard thereto. Medical books are not admissible in evi-
dence, either for the purpose of sustaining or contradicting
the opinion of a witness."
In City of Bloomington v. Schrock, i io Ill., 219, Dr.
Luce was called, and examined as a witness on behalf of
defendant, as an expert, and gave evidence tending to prove
that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in the respect
contended by defendant. He quoted from and made refer-
ence to no book; but upon his cross-examination, counsel for
plaintiff inquired of him whether he was acquainted with
"Playfair," and "Bedford," (treatises on midwifery), and
upon his responding in the affirmative, and that they were
standard authorities on questions of this character, counsel
proceeded to read at length from each of these authors,
consecutively, and then inquired of the witness whether he
agreed with the authors as to the parts so read. This was
objected to by the counsel for appellant, but allowed by
the Court, and the witness was required to make answer.
This was held to be error.
"The weight of currrent authority," it was said, "is
decidedly against the admission of scientific books in evidence
before a jury, although in some States they are admis-
sible.... . .- Where, however, an expert assumes to base
his opinion upon the work of a particular author, that work
may be read in evidence to contradict him.....
"Where a witness says a thing or a theory is so because
a book says so, and the book, on being produced, is dis-
covered to say directly to the contrary, there is a direct
contradiction which anybody can understand. But where
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a witness simply gives his opinion as to the proper treatment
of a given disease or injury, and a book is produced recom-
mending a different treatment, at most the repugnance is not
of fact, but of theory; and any number of additional books
expressing different theories, would obviously be quite as
competent as the first. But since the books are not admis-
sible as original evidence in such cases, it must follow that
they are not admissible on cross-examination, where their
introduction is not for the direct contradiction of something
asserted by the witness, but simply to prove a contrary
theory."
In Forest City Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 22 Appellate Court
(Ill.) 198, the Court said, on page 202:
"It was . . . . error to permit counsel for appellee,
over the objections of appellant, to read in the presence of
the jury to the witnesses Thompson and Ross, on their
cross-examinations, extracts from the treatises of Wilson,
Barr and Schook on steam boilers. The witnesses were tes-
tifying as experts, but it was immaterial, under the circum-
stances of the examination, whether they were properly
experts or not; in either event, the theories in the above
mentioned scientific works were incompetent testimony."
In Marshall v. Brown, 50 Michigan, 148, on the cross-
examination of Dr. VTood, a witness for the defendant, he
was asked if he was acquainted with a certain book. He
replied that he had heard of it but had not read it. He was
then asked whether it was considered good authority, and he
said it was. He was then requested to read a certain para-
graph during the recess of the court. W"hen the court con-
vened again, he was recalled and counsel reading from the
book the paragraph to which his attention had been called,
asked him whether there was a case reported of taking sul-
phite of zinc, followed by vomiting, purging, and death.
This was held improper cross-examination. It was said:
"As this was what the paragraph stated, the evident
purpose of the question was to put the passage from the book
in this indirect manner before the jury, instead of reading
from it directly. The witness demurred to this method of
examination, but was required to answer and did so.
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"The case differs from Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Mich., 584,
where a medical book was produced to contradict a witness
who professed to be testifying from it.
"The verdict must be set aside."
In Hall v. Murdock, 114 Michigan, 233, the injury to
the plaintiff was vigorously contested by the defendants,
and they introduced expert testimony tending to show that
the injury resulted from other causes. Medical experts
were placed upon the stand, who gave their experience in
such diseases, and their opinions that plaintiff's condition
was not the result of the injury. Upon cross-examining
these witnesses counsel for the plaintiff called their atten-
tion to certain medical works, and, under objection and
exception, read quite extensively to the jury.
On appeal the Court stated the rule thus: " This was
error, and we cannot hold that it was not prejudicial. The
only circumstances under which medical books can be read in
evidence is where the witness has based his opinions upon
them, and has referred to them as authority ..... .This
rule cannot be evaded on cross-examination."
(c)
May be cross-examined on books relied on.
In Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Michigan, 584 the plaintiff pro-
duced a witness who swore that he was a veterinary surgeon
of twenty-five years' standing, and his opinion as an expert
being called for, he swore that in his opinion the horse died
from being overfed when too hot, which would produce
colic. On cross-examination he said that colic was caused
by over-driving and feeding when the animal is too warm;
that all works of good authority spoke of it and that the
" Modern Horse Doctor," by Dr. Dodd, was a work of that
kind.
The defendant then offered to show from this work of
Dr. Dodd, where the author treats of colic. The plaintiff
objected to its introduction, but the Court admitted it.
This ruling was sustained for the following reasons:
"The rule is acknowledged in this State that medical
books are not admissible as a substantive medium of proof of
the facts they set forth. But the matter in question was
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not adduced with any such view. The witness assumed to
be a person versed in veterinary science; to be familiar with
the best books which treat of it, and among others with the
work of Dodd. He professed himself qualified to give an
opinion to the jury from the witness-stand on the ailment
of the plaintiff's horse and its cause, and the drift of his
opinion was to connect the defendant with that ailment.
He borrowed credit for the accuracy of his statement by
referring his learning to the books before mentioned and by
implying that he echoed the standard authorities like Dodd.
Under the circumstances it was not improper to resort to the
book, not to prove the facts it contained, but to disprove
the statement of the witness and to enable the jury to see
that the book did not contain what he had ascribed to it.
The final purpose was to disparage the opinion of the witness
and hinder the jury from being imposed upon by a false
light. The case is a clear exception to the rule which for-
bids the reading of books of inductive science as affirmative
evidence of the facts treated of."
In Huffman v. Click, 77 N. C., 55, the Court said, on
page 58:
" The medical expert himself may cite standard authors
in his profession as sustaining his views, and they may be
put in evidence by the other side to discredit him."
In City of Ripon v. Bittel, 30 Wis., 614, the Court said,
on page 619:
"The record does not inform us what the purpose or
object of the treatise was. Counsel suggest that it may
have been to expose or discredit the medical witnesses exam-
ined as experts, who, founding their opinions upon the same
treatises, recognized as standard authorities, had testified
that the books laid down such and such particular proposi-
tions or theories, or sustained such and such particular
conclusions, when in truth and in fact, the books did not do
so, and the witness was mistaken. Counsel asks if under
such circumstances the books would not be admissible as in
the nature of impeaching evidence, or to show that the
experts were in error. We cannot see that the admission
would be improper, and so must overrule the objection."
No effort has been made to exhaust the authorities, but
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it is believed that the cases to which reference has been
made are representative, and present the most satisfactory
reasons in support of the several rules.
These rules, simple and easily understood as they are,
are most frequently overlooked at the trial; in fact, it is
not uncommon to see the most elementary of them ignored in
the examination of medical experts, whether in actions for
personal injuries, or the ordinary prosecution for rape and
abortion.
Joseph H. Taulane.
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